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Abstract
Human conflict, geopolitical crises, terrorist attacks, and natural disasters can turn large parts of energy distribution
networks offline. Europe’s current gas supply network is largely dependent on deliveries from Russia and North Africa,
creating vulnerabilities to social and political instabilities. During crises, less delivery may mean greater congestion, as the
pipeline network is used in ways it has not been designed for. Given the importance of the security of natural gas supply,
we develop a model to handle network congestion on various geographical scales. We offer a resilient response strategy to
energy shortages and quantify its effectiveness for a variety of relevant scenarios. In essence, Europe’s gas supply can be
made robust even to major supply disruptions, if a fair distribution strategy is applied.
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Introduction
Almost everything we do in the course of a day involves the use
of energy. Yet, history has taught us that the threats to the security
of supply come in unexpected ways [1,2]. Examples of unforeseen
energy crises include the recent disputes between Russia and
Ukraine over the price of natural gas (2005–2006, 2007–2008,
2008–2009) [3], the disruption of the oil and gas production
industry in the US following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (2005)
[4], the terrorist attack on the Amenas gas plant that affected more
than 10% of Algerian production of natural gas (2013) [5], and the
supply shortage in March 2013, when the UK had only 6 hours
worth of gas left in storage as a buffer [6]. New vulnerabilities
could come from cyber attacks to the infrastructure [1],
particularly in the case of state-driven attacks [2]; be the result
of prolonged uncertainty or inaction on energy security in the US
or Europe [7]; or derive from an extended period of extremely
volatile prices due to intense international conflict [2].
Natural gas, a fossil fuel that accounts for 24% of energy
consumption in OECD-Europe [8], has been at the heart of these
crises. Gas is expensive to transport, and this is done mainly over a
pipeline network. The investments are large and are made with
long-term horizons, often of decades, and the costs are covered by
locking buyers into long-term contracts [9]. Moreover, current
infrastructure investments in Europe still derive from a historical
dependency on supply from Russia and North Africa [10]. This
dependency leaves the European continent exposed to both a
pipeline network that was not designed to transport large
quantities of gas imported via Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)
terminals, and to the effects of political and social instabilities in
countries that are heavily dependent either on the export of
natural gas ( e.g., Algeria, Libya, Qatar or Russia) or its transit (
e.g., Ukraine). Hence, it is challenging to build infrastructure that
will be resilient to a wide range of possible crisis scenarios [11].
In a crisis, less delivery may mean greater congestion. This is
due to the breakdown of major transit routes or production losses
in affected areas, which cause the supply network to be used in
different ways from what it was designed for. Hence, the available
resources cannot be distributed well with the remaining transport
capacities [12] [13,14]. This is why we need a method to handle
congestion.
To manage the gas pipeline network during crises, we propose a
decentralized model of congestion control that distributes the
available network capacity to each route, without sacrificing
network throughput [15–17]. A central controller makes the
system vulnerable both to attacks on the control centre and to
delays and failures of the lines of communication through the
network. In contrast, a decentralized method is more resilient to
failures because damage to the network has only a local effect and
the need for communication is reduced [15,18]. To illustrate our
model, we analyse the throughput of the present and planned
pipeline networks across a range of different crisis scenarios at
European, country and urban levels. The most challenging
scenario corresponds to a hypothetical crisis with Russia with a
complete cut-off of supply to Europe. We analyse how to alleviate
the impact of such scenarios, by the identification of country
groups with similar interests, which should cooperate closely to
manage congestion on the network. This acknowledges that many
of the 21st century challenges, such as the management of energy
grids and infrastructure networks [19–21], cannot be solved by
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technology alone, but do have a relevant behavioural or social
component [22–24].
Results
Data set and model
Our data set is organized in four layers (see ‘‘Databases’’ in File
S1), three of which are shown in Figure 1. The first layer is the
population density, which we compute from the 2012 Landscan
global population data set. The second layer is the European gas
pipeline network and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminals,
which we extract from the Platts 2011 geospatial data set. This
infrastructure is a spatial network, where nodes and links are
geographically located, and links have capacity and length
attributes. The third layer is defined by the urban areas in Europe
with 100,000 or more inhabitants, and we compile it from the
European Environment Agency and Natural Earth. The fourth layer is the
network of annual movements of gas via pipelines and of Liquefied
Natural Gas (LNG) via shipping routes (see Figure 2). We
represent gas flowing from an exporting country m (including
LNG) to an importing country n, by a directed network with
weighted adjacency matrix Tmn.
Gas enters the network at source nodes, is transported over long
distances on the pipeline transmission network, and then passed to
the distribution network that delivers it to consumers. Here we
model only the transport of gas on the transmission network. To
model consumption spatially, we first need a tessellation of each
country into disjoint sets of urban and non-urban areas, such that
the pipeline network in an area is associated with the population it
serves. Urban areas are naturally defined by the boundary of their
spatial polygons. We partition non-urban areas by a Voronoi
tessellation with the gas pipeline nodes as generators, respecting
country borders and excluding all urban areas (see ‘‘The Model’’
in File S1).
We assume that the flow of gas on each pipeline intersecting an
urban polygon ( i.e., the border of the urban area) is directed
towards the centre of the urban area. For simplicity, we also
assume that such pipelines supply the urban area from the closest
node to the urban polygon that is located inside the urban area.
Moreover, each non-urban area is defined by a Voronoi cell, and
we assume that it is supplied by the cell generator node (see ‘‘The
Model’’ in File S1).
To connect sink to source nodes with paths (see Contract Paths
in Methods), we first go through each non-zero entry in the Tmn
transport matrix and link each sink node in an importing country n
to the Wmn~min(10,sm) closest nodes in an exporting country m,
if m is a country, or to all LNG terminals in country n, if m is
LNG, where sm is the number of gas pipeline nodes in an
exporting country m.
To allocate demand to individual paths, we start with the
assumption that the demand Tmn of an importing country n from
an exporting country m is distributed proportionally to the
population of country n [25]. We next split the demand Tmn
among all source to sink paths between countries m and n,
proportionally to the population served by each sink node. We
now have a value of demand associated with each path, and
therefore with each sink node. Finally, we replace each path by a
set of identical paths, each having the minimum demand on the
network. This implies that all paths have the same demand, while
doubling the demand on a path is equivalent to creating two
identical paths with the original demand (see ‘‘The Model’’ in File
S1).
To begin integrating routing and congestion control, we first
consider how to distribute the capacity ci of one single congested
link over the bi~
Pr
j~1 Bij paths that pass through the link, where
B is the link-path incidence matrix (Bij~1 if link i belongs to the
path rj and Bij~0 otherwise), and where r is the number of paths
on the network (see Table 1 of the File S1). To find the exact
routing for these paths, we apply an iterative algorithm that, for
each source-sink pair, finds the path with minimum effective path
length, where the effective link length is given by eli~ ShiT=hið Þali,
li is the length of link i, hi~ci=(1zbi), and a~0:03 (see ‘‘The
Model’’ in File S1).
We consider two baseline scenarios: the present and future
networks. The present baseline scenario is the network that has
been operational since 2011; the future baseline scenario extends
the present network by the planned and under construction
pipelines. To determine the network effects of crises, we analyse a
range of scenarios that consist in hypothetically removing
exporting ( e.g., Russia) or transit ( e.g., Ukraine) countries from
the baseline scenarios. The scenarios are, thus, identified by the
baseline (present or future) and the hypothetically removed
country. For example, the present Russia scenario is given by
the present network excluding Russia, that is removing all entries
in the transport matrix Tmn that are movements of gas originating
in Russia. Similarly, the future Ukraine scenario is determined by
removing all Ukrainian nodes and links from the future network.
Broadly, there are three strategies to manage congestion [26].
First, expanding the network capacity is the most obvious way to
lower congestion. The EU has a plan to build major pipelines
crossing the continent, that should lower European dependency on
Russia (see planned pipelines in Figure S1 of the File S1). Here, we
include these planned pipelines in the future scenarios, but make
no suggestions for extra infrastructure because the costs of
expanding network capacity are high, and thus our focus is on
how to best manage the existing and planned network capacity.
Second, implementing congestion pricing is a way to cap the
consumption of heavy users that cause network bottlenecks.
Finally, by identifying groups of importing countries that have
similar dependencies on exporting countries, we map a vast
number of consumers to a relatively small number of parties that
may be able to cooperate during crises [27].
Figure 1. Spatial data layers involved in our analysis:
population density (source: Landscan 2012); gas pipeline
network and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminals (source:
Platts 2011); and major urban areas (sources: European
Environment Agency and Natural Earth). Map composed in ESRI
ArcGIS.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090265.g001
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We are aiming at controlling congestion in situations where the
network has to perform a function for which it was not designed.
For congestion control, we are using the proportional fairness
algorithm (see Methods), which is inspired by the way capacity
is managed on the Internet [15,28,29]. This approach could be
adjusted to other types of critical infrastructures, such as the power
grid and road networks. The main idea behind proportional
fairness is to use pricing on the links in order to control congestion
(see Methods and ‘‘Congestion Control’’ in File S1). Use of non-
congested links is free up to a threshold, above which the cost that
a path incurs for using a link increases linearly, but steeply, with
the difference between link capacity and link utilization. Hence,
paths that traverse many congested links pay a high cost for
contributing to congestion, and thus get a smaller flow allocation
than paths that avoid congestion. A flow is proportionally fair if, to
increase a path flow by a percentage e, we have to decrease a set of
Figure 2. Natural gas imports by pipeline and via Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminals in Europe during 2011 (million cubic
meters). Gas exporting (importing) countries are on the left (right) of the image. For each exporting country, we show the breakdown of the
volumes of gas exported annually, together with the importing countries served. For each importing country, we show the volumes of gas imported
annually, together with the diversity of supply.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090265.g002
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other path flows, such that the sum of the percentage decreases is
larger or equal to e. We view the network as an optimizer and the
proportional fairness policy as a distributed solution to a global
optimization problem [30,31].
Simulation Results
For each scenario, we hypothetically remove the scenario
country from the network and, if m is an exporting country,
remove row m in the Tmn transport matrix. Since the network
topology and the flow network Tmn depend on the scenario, we
then re-compute the source-sink pairs, the demand of each pair,
and we also replace every source-sink path with a number of
identical paths, each having the minimum demand in the network.
Finally, we apply the proportional fairness congestion control
algorithm to the resulting network and paths. We assume that all
countries are willing to cooperate, that is, adhere to the rules of the
congestion control policy. To assess the effect of the range of
scenarios, we then analyse the throughput at the scales of the
European continent, countries, and of urban areas.
We compute the global network throughput, which is the sum of
the throughput at all sinks (urban and non-urban), for all the
scenarios. Our model reproduces successfully the expected
consequences of removing the major source and transit countries
from the network: the largest decreases in global network
throughput are caused by hypothetically removing Russia,
Ukraine, the Netherlands, LNG and Norway (see Figure 3).
We say that a country is resilient to crises if it combines high
throughput per capita across scenarios with a low coefficient of
variation of throughput. In addition, the network is considered
resilient to a scenario if the vectors of country throughput per
capita for the scenario and the baseline scenario are similar. To
start addressing the resilience of countries and the network to
supply and transit crises, we study the signatures in the scenario
space given by the country throughput per capita in each of the 20
scenarios. Similarly, a scenario can be seen as a point in the 32-
dimensional space of country throughput. The heat-map in
Figure 4A shows the throughput per capita for each pair of
countries and scenarios [32].
The country groups, determined by dendrograms and high-
lighted in gray, reflect a similar level of throughput per capita
achieved across the scenarios. Countries belong to the high
throughput per capita groups (highlighted in dark gray in the
figure) due to a combination of effects: diversity of supply; good
access to network capacity (strategic geographical location); and a
relatively small population (see ‘‘Results’’ in File S1). The
coefficient of variation, shown in Figure 4B for present and future
scenarios, measures the normalized dispersion of country through-
put per capita using the mean as a measure of scale. Larger values
indicate that the throughput accessible to a country varies across
scenarios. Figure 4B shows that countries in Eastern Europe have
high coefficient of variation of throughput per capita in the
scenarios where we hypothetically remove Russia or Ukraine. In
other words, countries in Eastern Europe are still very much
dependent on one single source country (Russia) and one major
transit country (Ukraine). Unexpectedly, we observe a spillover
effect from countries, such as Germany, which make large
investments in infrastructure. These countries themselves seem
to benefit less from such investments than some of their smaller
neighbours. The reason behind this spillover is that countries with
plentiful access to network capacity provide routes for neighbour-
ing countries to also access such capacity.
Figure 4A can be read from left to right: the scenarios that cause
the largest disruption appear on the left, and the most benign
scenarios are on the right. The present and future scenarios are
clustered together when either Russia, Ukraine, the Netherlands,
or Belarus are removed from the network, demonstrating that the
new pipelines being built will only improve slightly the
consequences of a hypothetical crisis with one of the major
exporting countries (Russia or the Netherlands), or with a critical
transit country (Ukraine or Belarus). It is thus very hard to change
the consequences of such scenarios even by building new pipelines.
We illustrate our model at a fine geographical scale in the heat-
map of Figure 4C, where we show the throughput for urban areas
in Europe with 1:5 million inhabitants or more, as the scenarios
vary. The figure suggests possible classifications of cities into
groups, highlighted in gray. We observe in Figure 4D that the
coefficient of variation is larger for cities in Eastern Europe than
for cities elsewhere (except Berlin, Vienna and Dusseldorf). Note
that Dublin is resilient to all scenarios because it is supplied from
the UK, which we never removed from the network. Observe also
Figure 3. Global network throughput by scenario. (A) A scenario
is named after the country that is hypothetically removed from the
network, and coloured in blue (orange) if the country is removed from
the present (future) baseline scenario. (B) The country removed per
scenario is coloured cyan (red) on the map, if it is an exporting (transit)
country. The total network throughput increases by 6:3% from the
present baseline to the future baseline scenario ( i.e., when the future
and planned pipelines are added to the present network). The most
challenging scenarios are the hypothetical removal of Russia, followed
by Ukraine, the Netherlands and LNG. When Russia is removed from the
network, the global network throughput falls by 32:7% relative to the
present baseline and by 28:1% in relation to the future baseline. Figure
created from authors’ data with ESRI ArcGIS.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090265.g003
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that Austria gets most of its gas from Russia, and only a little from
Norway, so Vienna is in a similar situation to Eastern European
cities.
Taken together, Figures 4A–D illustrate the resilience of
countries, urban areas and the network to the scenarios, by
showing how countries and urban areas with similar reactions to
different types of crises are grouped together by throughput or by
its coefficient of variation, and how different scenarios are
clustered by their effect on the countries and urban areas.
The most challenging scenario is a hypothetical crisis that would
cut-off supply from Russia to Europe. To investigate how Europe
could make use of its internal gas production to minimize the
impact of such a crisis, we simulate and quantify the effect of
replacing gas supply from Russia with supply from Norway and
the Netherlands. To do this, we start by creating a cut of European
countries into two groups. Group I is made of the geographical
cluster of countries that are heavily dependent on Russian gas, and
is defined by Eastern Europe (http://eurovoc.europa.eu/100277)
together with Estonia, Finland, Greece, Latvia and Lithuania.
Group II is defined by all other countries in our study (see
‘‘Databases’’ in File S1). We consider a new scenario where Russia
is removed from the network and the demand of countries in
group I is rerouted to the Netherlands and Norway. To do this, we
first create new paths linking each importing country in group I to
Norway and the Netherlands (see ‘‘The Model’’ in File S1) and we
update the matrix of gas flows to T
0
mn (see Methods). Next, we
apply a prefactor 0ƒbƒ1 to the values of the demand T 0mn of
countries in group II. The effect of b is to lower the utilization of
the network by countries of group II that do not depend heavily on
Russia. These countries typically have a high value of demand,
and hence by curtailing their demand, there will be more capacity
available to transport gas from Norway and the Netherlands to
group I countries. In Figure 5, we observe that group I countries
increase their access to network capacity as b decreases. Group II
countries, such as Austria, that are geographically on the main
routes that link Norway and the Netherlands to group I countries,
decrease their throughput as b decreases. These countries are
crucial: their throughput decreases as they share their network to
benefit the more populous group I countries. In contrast, access to
network capacity in routes supplying group II countries, such as
Germany and Italy, is broadly unaffected, even as b is lowered
considerably, because routes from Norway and the Netherlands to
group I countries use little network capacity from these group II
countries. Despite the increase in throughput for countries in
group I as b decreases, Figure 5 shows the difficulty in replacing
Russia by the Netherlands and Norway. Although we can hope to
recover between 40 and 50% of the baseline throughput for the
Czech Republic and Slovakia, we will only recover up to 5% of the
Russian supply to Ukraine and up to 20% of the Austrian supply.
Discussion
Agreed political management processes are needed for crises
scenarios, to guarantee supply to the most affected countries and
urban areas and minimize the loss of gas by populations. Here, we
propose a decentralized algorithm inspired by congestion control
on the Internet, which would eliminate the need of improvisation
and complicated, lengthy negotiations every time a crisis occurs.
Such mechanism has a stabilizing effect because it lowers the
resource deficiency of the most affected countries [11,27]. We
demonstrate how a wide range of scenarios impacts network
throughput at global, country and urban levels, and how countries
and urban areas react to scenarios of hypothetical crises. We show
and quantify how countries that are heavily dependent on Russian
supply can lower the impact of a crisis, if other countries accept to
reduce their demand. Finally, our model tries to systematically
compare alternative policy options during energy crises, using
complex system models [33].
In summary, Europe is not necessarily trapped and helpless
during energy crises. The long-term interest in the sustainability of
the gas industry makes governments and the industry likely to
invest in rules and norms to enhance reciprocity and collective
efforts during crises. Because the number of governments and
companies ultimately involved in taking the decisions in Europe is
relatively high, governments could implement decentralized
solutions similar to the one we propose here, perhaps with a
centralized control solution as backup. At its heart, energy
security, like preparedness for future pandemics [34], is about
cooperation among nations [1]. To avoid European-wide crises,
nations must cooperate to share access to their critical infrastruc-
ture networks.
Methods
Let G~(V ,E,c,l) be an undirected and connected weighted
graph with no loops, node-set V and link-set E~f1, . . . ,gg. Each
link i has a capacity ci and a length li. The network has a set of r
paths connecting source to sink nodes. All links of a path transport
the same path flow. Different paths can share a link, even to
perform transport in different directions ( e.g., , during distinct
time intervals).
The relationship between links and paths can be described by
the link-path incidence matrix B as follows. Set Bij~1 if the link i
belongs to the path rj , and set Bij~0 otherwise. Matrix B has
dimensions g|r, and maps paths to the links contained in these
paths. When B is applied to a vector of path flows, the resulting
vector with components (Bf )i~
Pr
j~1 Bijfj is the total flow on the
links, or link throughput. We say that a link is a bottleneck if the sum
of the path flows of paths that pass through it is equal to the link
capacity. We assume that flows are elastic, that is path flows are
not fixed by demand, but can be adjusted according to the
available network capacity.
Contract paths
The pipeline contracts are for physical point-to-point transport
on a given system over a contract path [35,36]. The contract path is
a route between a pair of source and sink nodes, such that gas
flows from source to sink along that path and the transport costs
are only incurred on links along that route.
Figure 4. Heat-map [32], illustrating the variation of throughput across various scenarios and the effect of a scenario on the
network. The dendrograms are computed using a hierarchical clustering algorithm with the Euclidean norm and average linkage clustering. (A)
Heat-map of throughput at country level across various scenarios, allowing for a comparative analysis of the present versus future baseline scenarios,
as well as of crises versus baseline scenarios; (B) Coefficient of variation of throughput per capita of a country; (C) Heat-map of throughput at urban
level; (D) Coefficient of variation of throughput at urban scale. The gray areas denote groups of countries and urban areas that share common
patterns of throughput across scenarios.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090265.g004
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Proportional fairness congestion control
The key to a decentralized algorithm for proportional fairness is
to translate the optimization problem into an autonomous system
of coupled differential equation, with a fixed point equivalent to
the optimal solution of the optimization problem. To do this, we
use the result that the stable fixed point of a system of differential
equations is the maximum of the equations’ Lyapunov function.
A primal algorithm. A decentralized algorithm for conges-
tion control (see ‘‘Congestion Control’’ in File S1) solves the
system of coupled ODEs:
d
dt
fj(t)~1{fj(t)
Xg
i~1
Bijmi(t), ð1Þ
where the price on link i is
mi(t)~pi
Xr
j~1
Bijfj(t)
 !
, ð2Þ
and the price function is given by
Figure 5. Network throughput of selected countries in a hypothetical crisis with Russia. The right axis shows the country throughput
relative to the present baseline scenario. To minimize the impact of the loss of Russian supply, we re-allocate paths that originate in Russia to Norway
and the Netherlands (see Methods). We then partition countries into two groups: group I is composed of Eastern Europe ( http://eurovoc.europa.eu/
100277 ) together with Estonia, Finland, Greece, Latvia and Lithuania, and group II includes all other countries in our study. Group II countries have a
demand of bT
0
mn , where 0ƒbƒ1. Panels (A)–(C) show the throughput for selected group I countries (open squares), whereas panels (D)–(F) illustrate
the throughput for group II countries (open circles). Panels (A)–(C) demonstrate that countries in group I benefit from curtailing the demand of
countries in group II. In contrast, panels (D)–(E) show that some countries in group II are largely unaffected even when their own demand is curtailed
considerably. Finally, panel (F) demonstrates that supply to Austria is dominated by the demand reduction prefactor, b. Indeed, Austria is crossed by
routes from Norway and the Netherlands to group I countries, and these routes get a higher allocation of available capacity as Austrian demand
decreases ( i.e., as b decreases).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0090265.g005
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pi(y)~
max(0,y{ciz )
2
: ð3Þ
A dual algorithm. Consider a system where the shadow
prices vary gradually as a function of the path flows (see
‘‘Congestion Control’’ in File S1):
d
dt
mi(t)~
Xr
j~1
Bijfj(t){qi(mi(t)), ð4Þ
where
fj(t)~
1Pg
i~1 Bijmi(t)
, ð5Þ
and q(:) is the inverse of p(:). As ?0, the dual and primal
algorithms become equivalent. The rate of convergence to the
stable point is a function of the link-path incidence matrix B and of
the derivatives of pi (primal algorithm) and qi (dual algorithm), and
increases with the magnitude of the latter [15].
Rerouting the demand from Russia to the Netherlands
and Norway
When Russia is removed from the network, we reroute paths
between group I countries and Russia to paths between group I
countries and the Netherlands and Norway. To do this, we pair
the new source and sink nodes as described in Section ‘‘The
Model’’ in File S1, but we modify the Tmn matrix of gas flows. The
new T
0
mn matrix is found by reallocating the demand from Russia
for group I countries to the Netherlands and Norway, propor-
tionally to the production of gas of these two exporting countries:
T
0
(NO)n ~aNOT(RU)n
T
0
(NL)n ~aNLT(RU)n,
ð6Þ
where aNO~
P
j
T(NO)jP
j
T(NO)jzT(NL)j
and aNL~
P
j
T(NL)jP
j
T(NO)jzT(NL)j
are
the normalised proportions of supply from Norway and the
Netherlands, respectively.
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